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Abstract: We review Ferreirós and Lassalle Casanave's recently publishedbook "El árbol 
de los números". The book is a result of the Brazilian-Spanish conference “Sobre la elucidación 
del concepto de número: cognición, lógica y práctica matemática" hosted in Sevilla in 2013, and 
collects new papers on History and Philosophy of Mathematics as well as Mathematical 
Practice. These papers present results of investigations in Cognitive Sciences, Logic and 
Epistemology of mathematical certainty. In this review we present a general overview of 
the papers' contents, and advance a critical analysis of them. 
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The result of the Brazilian-Spanish meeting “Sobre la elucidación del concepto 
de número: cognición, lógica y práctica matemática" hosted in Sevilla in 2013, this book 
presents new results in Philosophy of Mathematics  due to researchers from 
Brazil, France, Italy and Spain. As the book title suggests, the articles share a 
common anti-foundationalist standpoint; that is, they are more concerned with 
the cognitive aspects of mathematical practice than with traditional questions 
about the logical and epistemological bases of the discipline (even though, as the 
organizers make clear in the introduction, the motivating questions are just the 
classical ones in which philosophers have been interested since antiquity). 
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The book is divided into three parts. The first one is composed by three 
papers on cognitive studies about mathematical cognition, by Valeria Giardino, 
Tatiana Arrigoni & Bruno Caprile, and Hourya Benis Sinaceur. 
Giardino's paper, “¿Dónde situar los fundamentos cognitivos de las 
matemáticas?", presents three experimental scenarios in order to test a hypothesis 
about the development of mathematical (especially arithmetical and geometrical) 
cognition: the first and second scenarios concern non-human and infant 
mathematical cognition, respectively; the third one concerns mathematical 
cognition in populations with a poor linguistic system. Giardino's hypothesis is 
that mathematical cognition, both in human as well as in non-human animals, 
starts as an evolutionarily advantageous form of perceptual cognition, namely, as 
perceptual recognition of numerosity and geometrical forms, but evolves in 
human beings so as to be able to process more abstract patterns through the 
development of skills related to counting, using maps and manipulating symbols. 
Further, Giardino seeks to point out the roles of both biological and cultural 
factors in the development of mathematical cognition. 
Arrigoni & Caprile's “La cognición de los enteros: una nueva propuesta" 
investigates the cognitive processes that occur in the formation of a theory of 
integers. After presenting a revision of the literature in cognitive sciences, the 
authors argue that preschool children's theory of integers lacks some 
characteristics of the integers, especially infinitude. Further, they claim it is only 
when that theory is enriched with the missing properties that a theory of integers 
as abstract objects arises. 
In “Filosofía de la biopsicología del número", Benis Sinaceur compares 
properly numerical cognitive attitudes with more general conceptual attitudes. 
Firstly, through an analysis of brain mapping results, Benis Sinaceur notes that, 
unlike other senses, perceptual recognition of numerosity is not related to a 
specialized part of the brain. Further, by reflecting on the different mental 
operations for processsing quantity and number, the author proposes a 
characterization of the different mental operations that are involved in perceptual 
recognition of numerosity as well as in numerical cognition. 
All of these works present the reader with an excellent overview of 
recent results regarding mathematical cognition from the point of view of 
cognitive science (and also, neurophysiology), and also advance interesting theses 
about the processes involved in the formulation of mathematical knowledge by 
human beings. 
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The second part of the book, on logic, starts with Oswaldo 
Chateaubriand's “Números como propiedades de segundo orden” followed by Frank 
Thomas Sautter's “Relaciones euclidianas de equinumerosidad”. These papers both 
propose alternatives to traditional perspectives on mathematical ontology and set 
theory. Chateaubriand argues against an ontological theory of numbers as objects 
in favour of a theory of numbers as higher-order properties. The latter theory 
faces at least two objections. Firstly, it implies assuming an ambiguous 
characterization of number (since there are infinite notions of number, each one 
for each rank in the infinite hierarchy of higher-order properties being assumed). 
Secondly, following Quine, it is possible to claim that, since properties do not 
have clear identity criteria, they do not fulfill a good ontological basis for 
numbers. Chateaubriand anticipates and replies both objections, in the case of 
the former objection by biting the bullet, and in the case of the second objection 
by claiming that objects do not satisfy a clear criterion of identification either. 
By his turn, in a very careful investigation, Sautter explores some 
alternatives to Cantor's definition of equinumerosity that, contrary to the 
Cantorian notion, respect the principle that the whole is greater than any of its 
proper parts (hereafter, Euclidean principle). The first alternative considered by 
the author, which he calls ‘total equinumerosity’, says that equinumerosity holds 
between two sets, A and B, if and only if all injective functions between A and B 
are bijective and there is an injection between A and B. This is a very restrictive 
alternative since it only identifies equinumerosity of finite sets. Sautter's second 
alternative, called ‘compositional equinumerosity’, is obtained by recognizing 
equinumerosity of any two sets A and B for which there are subsets C and D of 
A and B, respectively, such that A-C=B-D and C is totally equinumerous to D. 
This second alternative may be regarded as more permissible than the first. 
Sautter's third alternative, inspired by Bolzano, says that two sets, A and B, are 
equinumerous if and only if either they are Cantorian equinumerous and there 
are no subsets of A (respectively, B) which are compositionally equinumerous 
with B (respectively, A) or they are compositionally equinumerous between 
themselves. The fourth and last alternative considered by the author is obtained 
by relaxing the requirement of compositional equinumerosity that two 
equinumerous sets have finite equinumerous differences. Sautter shows then that 
the first three alternative notions of equinumerosity satisfy the Euclidean 
principle, either in a weak or in a stronger sense. The latter alternative, on the 
other hand, does not satisfy the Euclidean principle at all. Sautter's study is of 
100 Bruno Mendonça 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil., Campinas, v.39, n.1, pp. 97-103, jan.-mar. 2016. 
interest for any philosopher motivated by the type of question raised, for 
instance, by Tiles (1989) on the soundness of Cantor's cardinal arithmetic of 
infinite sets, as well as on the philosophical meaning of the mathematical 
questions posed by that work. 
The second part of the book continues with Sérgio Schultz's “Gödel versus 
Hilbert y su concepción simbólica de conocimiento” followed by Concha Martínez Vidal’s 
“A vueltas con la intuición en el conocimiento matemático”. Schultz presents some 
historical evidence for the thesis that Gödel's apparent anti-Platonism in the end 
of the 1920's is due to a subscription to methodological as well as conceptual 
aspects of Hilbert's program, more specifically the idea that mathematical truth 
is accessed via symbolic knowledge only. The author argues that it is just when 
such epistemological stance is questioned in the face of Gödel's second 
incompleteness theorem that Gödel adopts a Platonist conception about the 
epistemology of Mathematics. 
Vidal's paper advances an analysis of the concept of mathematical 
intuition in Gödel, Parsons and Bealer. Vidal wants to show how these authors 
understand intuition as a source of beliefs, and also whether intuition can provide 
any epistemic grounding. Further, Vidal considers whether, for these authors, 
intuition generates a priori knowledge. Vidal shows then that the first two authors 
understand intuition as a cognitive activity analogous to perception, but 
characterized in slightly different terms. For Gödelintuition is primarily a 
cognitive attitude towards propositions, and only derivatively towards objects, 
whereas Parsons takes the opposite view. Vidal argues that both characterizations 
face problems for which they do not provide a sufficient response: Gödel's 
proposal does not characterize adequately the relationship between primary and 
derivative forms of intuition, whereas Parsons does not provide a good 
explanation of the way in which intuition bases belief about infinitary properties. 
According to Vidal, Bealer, by his turn, characterizes intuition as an irreducible 
form of propositional attitude, associated with the possession of concepts. Vidal 
argues then that Bealer's thesis cannot characterize the way in which intuition can 
be accounted as an epistemological grounding. Vidal's conclusion is that none of 
these proposals present a sufficient account of the notion of mathematical 
intuition. Vidal's study is very useful to any reader wishing for a complete 
overview of the literature, but she does not proceed to a more popositive thesis 
on the subject, nor does she consider experimental data provided by cognitive 
science, differently from the methodological attitude of the works composing the 
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first part of the book that deal very strongly with results coming from cognitive 
science as well as related areas. 
The third and final part of the book, on mathematical practice, collects 
José Ferreirós' “Sobre la certeza de la aritmética”, Abel L. Casanave's “Conocimiento 
simbólico y aritmética en Hilbert” and, lastly, José M. Sagüillo's “Números y proposiciones 
en las formalizaciones de la aritmética de Peano, Gödel y Whitehead-Russell". 
Ferreirós argues that Peano Arithmetic (hereafter PA) is sound with 
respect to the collection of practices involved in the act of counting. This 
provides epistemological certainty for the basic Arithmetic which is axiomatized 
by that system. Further, Ferreirós claims that such certainty does not propagate 
for what he calls arithmetical number theory, which concerns the more advanced 
properties of Arithmetic (Ferreirós advocates such a dichotomy by considering 
the existence of advanced arithmetical theorems that up to now have not been proved 
using only resources of basic Arithmetic, e.g., Fermat's last theorem). 
Arithmetical number theory is based not in certainty but in quasi-empirical 
hypothesis, according to Ferreirós. The author focuses on arguing that the 
practice of counting verifies the induction axiom. This is the more problematic 
case for two reasons: firstly, the induction axiom allows us to deduce knowledge 
about infinitary properties from analysis of finitary cases only; secondly, the 
induction axiom in its original formulation is very liberal and suffers from 
impredicativity. On the second question, Ferreirós replies that the induction 
axiom allowed by the practice of counting is even more liberal than that 
formulated in PA. So, even if the various possible restrictions in the formulation 
of induction axiom can be an interesting theme of logical study (specially, for 
investigations in reverse Mathematics), they are not relevant for the question 
posed by Ferreirós. On the first question, Ferreirós claims that the induction 
axiom is verified through the very complex cognitive capacity of human beings 
of passing from the counting of concrete numbers to the imagination of an 
arbitrary possible number. Finally, the author considers whether the existence of 
non-standard models of PA is an objection to his claim. Calling attention to the 
fact that model theory is not grounded in basic Arithmetic (it is based in set 
theory), Ferreirós claims that the existence of non-standard models of PA is a 
result of arithmetical number theory and so does not enjoy nor conflicts with the 
certainty of basic Arithmetic (from the final comment it is possible to infer 
Ferreirós' negative opinion about the various enterprises on logical foundations 
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of Mathematics, which is explicitly expressed by him at the conclusion of the 
paper). 
Lassalle Casanave's entry continues the debate about certainty in 
Arithmetic in a more historical perspective, providing a philosophical analysis of 
Hilbert's dichotomies between notions that are real or ideal, finite or transfinite, 
intuitive or formal, concrete or abstract, contentful or without content, 
unproblematic or problematic. Firstly, Lassalle Casanave presents 
historiographical evidence that Hilbert's dichotomies cannot be interpreted by 
reducing the first and second elements of each pair to meaningful and 
meaningless notions, respectively. Hence, the author argues, Hilbert's 
dichotomies need to be understood in light of the tradition of symbolic 
knowledge that started with Leibniz, according to which mathematical 
knowledge can only be gained via symbolic manipulation. Lassalle Casanave 
claims that, for Hilbert, real, finite, intuitive etc. mathematical notions are the 
semantic counterparts of symbolic knowledge as surrogative knowledge. On the 
other hand, ideal, infinite, formal etc. mathematical notions are what are exhibited  
(a technical notion owing to the tradition of symbolic knowledge) in symbolic 
knowledge as a non-surrogative form of knowledge. It is possible to notice a 
disagreement between Ferreirós' and Lassalle Casanave's stances on the subject 
of certainty in Arithmetic; namely that by subscribing Hilbert's dichotomies, 
Lassalle Casanave limits certainty to Arithmetic's finitary part, whereas Ferreirós 
attributes certainty to the induction axiom as well. 
Finally, Sagüillo's paper proceeds to a compare analyses of Gödel's, 
Peano's and Whitehead & Russell's formalizations of Arithmetic, both in their 
technical aspects as well as in their philosophical assumptions. More specifically, 
Sagüillo claims these works give different definitions of both the domain of the 
discipline (i.e., the ontological commitments taken by arithmeticians) as well as 
the universe of discourse of the formalization (i.e., the ontological commitments 
associated with the given formal system). So, whereas Gödel's system only 
quantifies over numerical variables, Peano's system quantifies over individuasl in 
general and relativizes its arithmetical axioms to numbers. Further, Sagüillo 
argues that, Whitehead & Russell, by their turn, consider higher-order sets as 
composing the domain of Arithmetic and individuals in general as composing 
the universe of discourse of their formal system. Sagüillo sees in the variations 
between these treatments different ways of making a correspondence between 
arithmetical propositions and formulas of a formalized system of Arithmetic. 
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In general, the book advances very engaging arguments regarding the 
History and Philosophy of Mathematics as well as on mathematical cognition. In 
this sense, the works there collected strongly acknowledge the importance of 
empirical and historical studies for the investigation on Philosophy of 
Mathematics. Thus, these works are relevant to anyone that subscribes to a more 
naturalized approach to the subject. Furthermore, as a reflex of the peculiar anti-
foundationalist standpoint there presented, the works relativize the philosophical 
importance of logical studies in foundations of Mathematics, even though they 
do not reject completely the utility of this type of enterprise. 
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